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Introduction 
This article revisits a vexed and much-debated question: when is it 'fair' for an employer, in 
the course of restructuring its business, to dismiss an employee for declining to accept 
changes in her or his terms and conditions of employment? 
The background to this question is the fiercely competitive climate in which many 
businesses, exposed to the full force of global economic pressures, find themselves, giving 
rise to the need for constant adaptation and, conversely, the spectre of dismissal for many 
employees. 1   The legal context is a lengthening series of Labour Court (LC) and Labour 
Appeal Court (LAC) decisions in which the meaning of substantive fairness under these 
circumstances has been considered in great 
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detail, but in divergent ways. 2   Though every judgment is case-bound to a greater or 
lesser extent, this article will try to extrapolate principles of general application. 
The basic principles, at least, seem clear. Dismissal disputes are 'disputes of right', which 
are resolved by arbitration or adjudication; disputes about changes to terms and conditions 
of employment are 'disputes of interest'. Yet, in practice, there appears to be some scope 
for overlap. Tamara Cohen sums up the position as it stood in mid-2004: 
 'Interest disputes are intended to be resolved in the collective bargaining arena. Allowing an employer to 
undermine this process by unilaterally exercising the power to dismiss in order to compel an employee to 
accept a demand, would be in breach of s 187(1)(c) 3   and would constitute an automatically unfair dismissal. 
Nevertheless the wide scope of ''mutual interest' disputes encompasses proposed changes to terms and 
conditions of employment as part of a business restructuring exercise. 
 Notwithstanding the clear demarcation of interest and rights disputes and their respective dispute-resolution 
forums, such disputes by their very nature also fall within the ambit of s 189. 4   Provided the employer is able 
to prove on the facts that the purpose of the proposed changes and resultant dismissals is motivated by 
operational requirements and is ''not underpinned by ulterior motive to dismiss for not acceding to a demand', 
no conflict between s 187(1)(c) and s 189 need arise.' 5 
Thus, two questions are involved: when dismissal in a restructuring dispute will be found 
automatically unfair in terms of s 187(1)(c) , and when it may be justified by the employer's 
operational needs (assuming that a fair procedure is followed). This article deals with the 
first question only in passing and focuses on the second. 6 
That the question is a sensitive one, involving a delicate weighing-up of employers' rights 
and interests against those of workers, is 
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evident from the case law. In SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd , 7   decided 
in February 2005, Murphy AJ drew the following balance sheet which is worth quoting at 
some length: 
 'It is trite to say that employers are entitled to reduce staff for a variety of reasons, including pursuing what 
they may consider to be a better cost structure. That said, this court remains duty bound to exercise an 
appropriate level of supervision and review in relation to employer's decisions regarding the need for 
retrenchment.... The debate about finding the appropriate level of scrutiny is well known, and has endured for 
the best part of two decades. Different judges have formulated the test differently at different times, 
introducing subtle variations and nuances.... The test formulated by the legislature in the 2002 amendments 8   
harkens back to the principle of proportionality or the rational basis test applied in constitutional and 
administrative adjudication in other jurisdictions. As such, the test involves a measure of deference to the 
managerial prerogative about whether the decision to retrench is a legitimate exercise of managerial authority 
for the purpose of attaining a commercially acceptable objective.... The second leg of the enquiry is directed at 
the investigation of the proportionality or rationality of the process by which the commercial objectives are to 
be achieved. Thus, there should be a rational connection between the employer's scheme and its commercial 
objective, and through the consideration of alternatives an attempt should be made to find the alternative 
which least harms the rights of the employees in order to be fair to them. The alternative eventually applied 
need not be the best means, or the least drastic alternative. Rather it should fall within the range of reasonable 
options available in the circumstances allowing for the employer's margin of appreciation to the employer in the 
exercise of its managerial prerogative. The formulation of the test in this way adds nothing new. It simply 
synthesises what has already been said in Discreto 9   and BMD Knitting Mills .' 10 
The 'subtle variations and nuances' alluded to by Murphy AJ, however, have been rather 
more than that. Between Discreto and BMD Knitting Mills , in relation to the 'appropriate 
level of scrutiny' of managerial decisions and the criterion to be used in exercising it, there 
was tension as well as continuity. And in Algorax 11   and subsequent 
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decisions, the LAC expressed itself in terms which, on the face of it, seem to lay a basis for 
a new and (potentially) far more stringent approach in determining the extent of the 
employer's freedom to dismiss. This evolution forms the focus of the article. In conclusion, it 
is also considered to what extent the new s 189A lays down a different (and less rigorous) 
criterion of substantive fairness in respect of dismissals falling within its ambit than that 
defined by the courts in terms of ss 188 and 189 of the LRA. 
 
 
From Discreto to Algorax 
In SA Chemical Workers Union & others v Afrox Ltd 12   the LAC concisely summed up the 
law as it stood at the end of the 1990s. It held that, in dismissals based on operational 
requirements  - 
 'an employer must seek appropriate measures to avoid dismissals, minimize their number, change their timing 
and mitigate their adverse effects (s 189(2)(a) ). These are all indications that dismissal should at least not be 
the first resort, even though the LRA does not expressly state that dismissal should only be used as a last 
resort when dismissing for operational reasons'. 
In reaching this conclusion the court was reasserting the dominant 'non-interventionist' 
approach, expressed by Froneman DJP in Discreto in the following much-quoted passage: 
 'The function of a court in scrutinizing the consultation process is not to second-guess the commercial or 
business efficacy of the employer's ultimate decision (an issue on which it is, generally, not qualified to 
pronounce upon), but to pass judgment on whether the ultimate decision arrived at was genuine and not 
merely a sham (the kind of issue which courts are called upon to do in different settings, every day). The 
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manner in which the court adjudges the latter issue is to enquire whether the legal requirements for a proper 
consultation process have been followed and, if so, whether the ultimate decision arrived at by the employer is 
operationally and commercially justifiable on rational grounds, having regard to what emerged from the 
consultation process. It is important to note that when determining the rationality of the employer's ultimate 
decision on retrenchment, it is not the court's function to decide whether it was the best decision under the 
circumstances, but only whether it was a rational commercial or operational decision, properly taking into 
account what emerged during the consultation process.' 13 
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At the time, this judgment was seen as putting paid to the more interventionist approach 
which, under previous Act, reached its high-water mark in the judgment of the former LAC 
in NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines Ltd 14   where the court held as follows: 
 'Fairness in this context goes further than a bona fide and commercial justification for the decision to retrench. 
It is concerned, first and foremost, with the question whether termination of employment is the only reasonable 
option in the circumstances. It has become trite for the courts to state that termination of employment for 
disciplinary and performance related reasons should always be a measure of last resort. That, in our view, 
applies equally to termination of employment for economic or operational reasons.' 
On appeal, the content of the duty to consult formed the crux of the argument and the 
Appellate Division (AD) was not called upon to consider the boundaries of substantive 
fairness in any depth. While emphasizing the importance of proper and timeous 
consultation, and the need to consider alternatives to dismissal, the AD contented itself with 
observing that 'the ultimate decision to retrench is one which falls squarely within the 
competence and responsibility of management'. 15   This might be seen as less than an 
endorsement of the above pronouncement by the LAC. Three years later, following the 
enactment of the current LRA, a differently constituted LAC in Discreto appeared to dispose 
decisively of the approach adopted by its predecessor, asserting in effect that the substance 
of an employer's decision to dismiss, provided it is based on actual operational reasons and 
complies with the requirements of procedural fairness, falls beyond the jurisdiction of the 
courts. 
Five years later, however, the LAC in CWIU v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 16   appeared to revert to 
the position as stated in NUMSA v ADE . In Algorax , it should be noted, the dismissals were 
found to be automatically unfair; the comments quoted below were therefore obiter. 
Nevertheless, as will appear, the LC in subsequent matters tended to treat them as 
authoritative statements of the law. They must therefore be given their due weight. 
Both the cardinal principles asserted in Discreto came in for significant revision. Firstly, 
dealing with the point that the court 'normally will not have the business knowledge or 
expertise which the employer as a businessperson may have to deal with problems in the 
workplace', Zondo JP qualified it as follows: 
 'This is true. However, it is not absolute and should not be taken too far. When either the Labour Court or this 
court is seised with a dispute about the fairness of a dismissal, it has to determine the fairness of the dismissal 
objectively. The question whether the dismissal was fair or not must be answered by the court. The court must 
not defer to the employer for the purpose of answering that question. In other words it cannot say that the 
employer thinks it is fair, and therefore, it is or 
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 should be fair.... Furthermore, the court should not hesitate to deal with an issue which requires no special 
expertise, skills or knowledge that it does not have but simply requires common sense or logic.' 17 
Secondly, having noted that dismissal may be regarded as 'the death penalty in the field of 
labour', the court went on to draw a conclusion that appeared to fly directly in the face of 
earlier jurisprudence: 
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 '[Section 189 implies] that the employer has an obligation, if at all possible, to avoid dismissals of employees 
for operational requirements altogether or to ''minimize the number of dismissals', if possible, and to consider 
other alternatives of addressing its problems without dismissing the employees and to disclose in writing what 
those alternatives are that it considered and to give reasons ''for rejecting each of those alternatives'. It seems 
to me that the reason for the lawmaker to require all of these things from the employer was to place an 
obligation on the employer to only resort to dismissing employees for operational requirements as a measure of 
last resort . If that is correct, the court is entitled to intervene where it is clear that certain measures could 
have been taken to address the problems without dismissals for operational reasons or where it is clear that 
dismissal was not resorted to as a measure of last resort.' 18 
Taken together, these pronouncements seemed to herald a more interventionist approach, 
which other members of the LAC bench enlarged on in subsequent decisions. In Enterprise 
Foods (Pty) Ltd v Allen & others 19   Davis AJA, referring to the above passage in Algorax , 
interpreted it as follows: 
 'The court must examine whether there is a fair reason to dismiss. If ... there are two rational solutions, one of 
which preserves jobs, fairness as mandated by the Labour Relations Act ... dictates that this is the solution that 
must be adopted by the employer.' 
And in General Food Industries Ltd v FAWU 20   Nicholson JA, without referring directly to 
Algorax , summarized the employer's position in very similar terms: 
 'After consultations have been exhausted the employer must decide whether to proceed with the retrenchments 
or not. The loss of jobs through retrenchment has such a deleterious impact on the life of workers and their 
families that it is imperative that - even though reasons to retrench employees may exist - they will only be 
accepted as valid if the employer can show that all viable alternative steps have been considered and taken to 
prevent the retrenchments or to limit these to a minimum.' 
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This evolution in our case law should be viewed in a broader social context. The period 
1999-2002 saw intense debate surrounding the proposed amendments to South Africa's 
labour legislation. Preceding and following the Presidential Jobs Summit held in October 
1998, the rising tide of job losses emerged as the focus of trade union disquiet while in 
parliament, introducing his budget vote for 1999, Minister of Labour Membathisi Mdladlana 
described unemployment as 'the biggest challenge that confronts our young democracy'. 21   
For the trade union movement, indeed, the greatest single problem which the amendments 
to the LRA needed to address was the perceived lack of protection it offered to employees 
against dismissal for operational reasons. 22   The introduction of s 189A, as heralded in 
the Labour Relations Amendment Bill 2001, reflected the main thrust of the legislative 
response. The extent to which the amendments addressed trade union (or employer) 
concerns falls beyond the scope of this article. The focus, instead, will be on the changing 
judicial response during the period when the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2002 was in 
the making - and since. 
Can it be said that, following Algorax , our law has reached a new phase in which the courts 
will not only be 'less deferential' 23   towards employers' decisions to dismiss but will not 
hesitate to set them aside when 'common sense or logic' (in the court's view) dictate 
otherwise, or when dismissal is anything but a 'last resort'? The position adopted in Algorax 
, it seems clear, goes further than the cautionary note sounded by Davis AJA in BMD 
Knitting Mills . In the latter case Davis AJA qualified his statement by adding that 'the 
enquiry is not directed to whether the reason offered is the one which would have been 
chosen by the court. Fairness, not correctness is the mandated test'. 24   In addition Davis 
AJA limited the purpose of the court's enquiry to establishing 'whether a reasonable basis 
exists on which the decision ... to dismiss for operational requirements is predicated'. 25   
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Murphy AJ, indeed, mentions Discreto and BMD in one breath (above). In Algorax, 
Enterprise Foods and General Food Industries , on the other hand, the 
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dividing line between 'fairness', as explained in Discreto , and 'correctness' is less clear-cut. 
No longer is the fairness of the decision judged essentially with reference to the employer's 
subjective intent (lack of bad faith or otherwise); the enquiry may now extend to the 
outcome of the decision (saving jobs or losing them). 26 
Does this mean that every dismissal for operational reasons must be found substantively 
unfair if it can be shown that the employer had a reasonable possibility of saving the job in 
question? Is business restructuring involving job losses effectively prohibited except as a 
measure of last resort? If not, what leeway remains for a business to change to less 
labour-intensive methods of operation in order to become more competitive? The remainder 
of the article will try to give a legal answer to these very practical questions. 
 
 
'Fairness' 
Section 188 of the LRA states that dismissal for operational reasons will only be fair if the 
employer proves 'that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason ... based on the employer's 
operational requirements' (emphasis added). The term 'operational requirements', as 
defined in s 213, is broad enough to include every conceivable business consideration that 
might lead an employer to consider dismissal in the context of restructuring. Had this been 
all the LRA said, employees would have been all but defenceless; every dismissal must, 
after all, impact in some way on an employer's operational requirements. As noted in BMD 
Knitting Mills , however, the word 'fair' introduces a vital qualification. Though seldom 
considered explicitly by the courts and frequently taken for granted, it is this concept - 
rather than the presence or absence of an 'operational' basis for the employer's decision - 
that lies at the heart of most disputes about substantive fairness. 
The starting-point, therefore, is that an enquiry into the substantive fairness of an 
operational requirements dismissal is twofold: first, whether it was in fact based on 'the 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer' 27   and, second, 
whether that reason was 'fair' in the sense of being adequate, when weighed up against the 
employee's basic right to fair labour practices, 28   to justify dismissal. It is instructive in 
this regard to note the corresponding provisions of the United Kingdom Employment Rights 
Act 1996. Section 98(1) of that statute in the first place requires the employer to show that 
the reason for 
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the dismissal is 'that the employee was redundant'. This, however, is not the end of the 
enquiry. Subsection (4) goes on to provide as follows: 
 'Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether 
the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)- 
 (a)  depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the 
employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient 
reason for dismissing the employee, and 
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 (b)  shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.' 29 
It is submitted that the qualifier 'fair' in s 188 serves a similar purpose as 'reasonably' in s 
98(4)(a) of the ERA. 30 
A further aid to interpretation is to be found in s 3(a) of the LRA, which states that the Act 
must be interpreted 'to give effect to its primary objects'. These include (a) giving effect to 
and regulating the fundamental rights conferred by s 23 of the final Constitution, and (b) 
giving effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). It is submitted that s 23 of the Constitution is of little assistance 
in the present context in that it contains no residual concept of fairness nor any more 
precise definition than that laid down by the LRA. 31   ILO Convention 158 likewise adds 
little, stating merely that '[t]he employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless 
there is a valid reason for such termination ... based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service'. 32   More light, however, is shed on the matter by 
ILO Recommendation 166, 33   which contains the following: 
 '19. (1) All parties concerned should seek to avert or minimise as far as possible termination of employment for 
reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, without prejudice to the efficient operation 
of the undertaking, establishment or service, and to mitigate the adverse effects of any termination of 
employment for these reasons on the worker or workers concerned.... 
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 21. The measures which should be considered with a view to averting or minimising terminations of 
employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature might include, inter alia , 
restriction of hiring, spreading the workforce reduction over a certain period of time to permit natural reduction 
of the workforce, internal transfers, training and retraining, voluntary early retirement with appropriate income 
protection, restriction of overtime and reduction of normal hours of work.' 
While an ILO Recommendation does not have the force of international law, it may 
nevertheless be persuasive when seeking to interpret a requirement of the relevant 
convention or, in this case, the LRA. The abovementioned guidelines have entered our case 
law, 34   and it has been noted that 'the Act and the Code follow the approach of the 
International Labour Organization concerning fair termination of employment' as manifested 
in Convention 158 and Recommendation 166. 35   Section 189(2)(a) of the LRA, however, 
only stipulates measures to 'avoid' or 'minimize' dismissals as a topic of consultation. 
Recommendation 166 goes further, suggesting that an employer's decision to dismiss will 
only be 'fair' or 'valid' if the employer has sought to 'avert or minimize' the dismissals and 
that, in particular, the measures set out in article 21 of the recommendation (above) should 
be among those considered. This restriction on the exercise of managerial prerogative is, 
however, subject to the qualification that no measure prejudicial to the 'efficient operation' 
of the business need be taken. Business efficiency rather than necessity, in other words, is 
the yardstick. 
This rather minimalist approach, akin to that enunciated in Discreto , is a far cry from the 
language adopted by the LAC in Algorax and subsequent cases (above). International law 
and constitutional values, of course, lay down a floor of rights, not a ceiling, and parliament 
as well as the courts are at liberty to give those rights a more generous interpretation 
provided this does not offend against any other basic right or (in the case of the courts) go 
beyond the meaning that may legitimately be ascribed to the provision in question. Is this 
what the LAC has done in its interpretation of a 'fair' reason for dismissal based on 
operational requirements? Has it, in effect, ignored the proviso contained in article 20 and 
given the measures listed in article 21 (assuming they are applicable) an all but obligatory 
nature? Is 'necessity' rather than 'effectiveness' the crux of the new definition of substantive 
fairness? 
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This question was answered in the affirmative by Zondo JP in County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v 
OCGAWU & another 36   where, several months prior to the Algorax judgment, he ruled as 
follows: 
 'If the employer relies on operational requirements to show the existence of a fair reason to dismiss, he must 
show that the dismissal of the employee could not be avoided. That is why both the employer and the employee 
or his representatives are required by s 189 of the Act to explore the possibilities of avoiding the employee's 
dismissal.' 
The position, then, would seem to be clear. A reason for dismissal based on operational 
reasons is 'fair' only if dismissal is 'a measure of last resort' or 'cannot be avoided'. This 
follows, above all, from the duty of the employer to consult about measures to 'avoid' 
dismissals and, possibly, to implement them proactively. What would be the purpose of such 
consultation if the employer is free to dismiss regardless of the outcome? 
Indeed, did the LAC even in Discreto not qualify its rationale for non-interference with an 
employer's 'rational commercial or operational decision' by adding the rider 'properly taking 
into account what emerged during the consultation process'? 
Before following the question to its conclusion it is necessary to consider a final piece of the 
legal jigsaw puzzle: the decision by the LAC in Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA, 37   
unanimously approved by the Supreme Court of Appeal in NUMSA & others v Fry's Metals 
(Pty) Ltd. 38 
 
 
Fry's Metals: Dismissal for Profit 
If in the Algorax line of decisions the LAC appeared to go to new lengths in protecting 
employees against dismissal for operational reasons, in Fry's Metals it appeared to lean in 
the opposite direction. The judgment is most noted for the distinction it drew between, on 
the one hand, the operationally justified dismissal of employees who decline to accept 
changes in employment conditions arising from business restructuring and, on the other, 
automatically unfair dismissal 'to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any 
matter of mutual interest between the employer and employee'. 39   That distinction, which 
has been the subject of much debate, will not be explored in this article except to note that, 
following the SCA decision and bar a successful appeal to the Constitutional Court, it must 
now be 
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considered settled law. In addition, however, Zondo JP went on to make an observation as 
to the extent of substantive fairness that was seen by many as significantly extending an 
employer's freedom to dismiss. Dealing with the proposition that an employer may not 
dismiss for operational reasons 'when this was done for the purpose of making more profit 
as opposed to where it was resorted to in order to ensure the survival of the business or 
undertaking', Zondo JP disposed of it as follows: 
 '[T]hat argument has no statutory basis in our law. This is so because all that the Act refers to, and recognizes, 
in this regard is an employer's right to dismiss for a reason based on its operational requirements without 
making any distinction between operational requirements in the context of a business the survival of which is 
under threat and a business which is making profit and wants to make more profit.' 40 
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In reality, this was nothing new. 'Increasing profits' is clearly an operational consideration, 
resorting under 'financial reasons' in the definition of 'operational requirements'. The same 
point had, in fact, been made in earlier judgments of the LAC without causing controversy. 
41   Nothing was made of it on appeal, and the SCA had no occasion to consider it. But, 
though the notion of employers being free to dismiss workers 'merely to increase profit' 
may seem to open the floodgates to dismissal virtually at will, the causal nexus between a 
dismissal and the employer's operational needs must still pass the test of fairness. The real 
question remains: will it be 'fair' in the given circumstances to dismiss employees in order 
to increase profit or efficiency? At which point does the employer's right to seek 'more 
profit' outweigh employees' right not be dismissed unfairly, and how must it be measured? 
In Fry's Metals this question did not arise, and was thus left unanswered. 
Far more significant in the present context is the apparent contradiction between the 
judgment in Fry's Metals and that in Algorax . In Fry's Metals , Zondo JP expressly rejected 
the contention that the 'survival of the business or undertaking' is the sole criterion of 
'fairness' in relation to an operational decision to dismiss; in principle, an employer may also 
dismiss even if it 'is making profit and wants to make more profit'. But if this is so, how can 
it also be said (to quote Algorax ) that an employer may 'only resort to dismissing 
employees for operational requirements as a measure of last resort'? Does Fry's Metals not 
mark a subtle reversion to Discreto ? Once it is accepted that an employer may fairly 
dismiss employees to increase its profit, is the court not abandoning the criterion of 
'necessity' and accepting that the 'commercial 
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or business efficacy' of the decision to dismiss is (subject to the requirements of ss 189 and 
189A) for the employer and not the court to determine? 
These questions suggest, in the first place, that the contrast between Discreto and Algorax 
is less absolute than it may seem. In the remainder of this article it will be attempted to 
weave together the strands of the various judgments and arrive at a legally and practically 
consistent synthesis. To this end, important clues are to be found in a number of judgments 
following Algorax in which the same questions were directly or indirectly addressed. 
NUMSA v Dorbyl 
In NUMSA & others v Dorbyl Ltd & another , 42   the dispute - as in SACWU v Afrox  
(above) - involved the dismissal of employees who had been engaged in a protected strike. 
Following the test applied in Afrox , Fulton AJ was referred to the ruling in Algorax  (above) 
and noted, correctly, that '[t]he decision ... appears to conflict with the decision in the Afrox 
matter'. 43   The court then dealt with the conflict as follows: 
 'With respect, I think that the Algorax decision ... is somewhat anomalous if one considers that the Labour 
Appeal Court in [Fry's Metals ] accepted that there is nothing in the LRA which precludes an employer from 
retrenching employees in order to increase its profits.... [The union's counsel] did not contend that an employer 
must be on the brink of insolvency before it is entitled to retrench employees. He said that he understood the 
''last resort' requirement in the Algorax decision to mean that an employer must show that retrenchments were 
necessary . Be that as it may, the court in Algorax did not mention, even obliquely, the Afrox decision and 
therefore in my view cannot be taken to have overturned that decision.' 44   (Emphasis added.) 
The court did not elaborate on its reasoning, and went on to rule that 'it is more probable 
than not that the dominant or main reasons for the dismissals were a variety of proper 
operational requirements and not the strike itself. I consequently find that the dismissals 
were substantively fair'. 45   Implicitly, the court appeared to be saying that the test of 'last 
resort' used in Algorax must not be taken at face value and that, in particular, it does not 
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refer purely and simply to the survival of the business. At the same time, a test of 
'necessity' appeared to be accepted. From the context it appears that 'necessity' is used in a 
different sense from that ascribed to it above. 46   The notion of 'necessity' implies a 
purpose which, in the context of the Algorax decision, might have been taken to be the 
survival of the business. As relied on 
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by Fulton AJ it clearly carries no such connotation. What the legitimate purpose of 
'necessary' dismissals might be, however, was not explained and the question was rendered 
redundant by the finding that, in any event, the Afrox decision (and with it the Discreto 
approach) remained good law that could be applied irrespective of what Algorax  - conflict 
or no conflict - might mean. 
For an element of conflict undoubtedly remains, if only between the disclaimer in Afrox that 
'fairness' implies dismissal as a measure of last resort, and the categorical assertion in 
Algorax that it does precisely that. 
FAWU v SA Breweries 
A different approach was followed in the controversial matter of FAWU v SA Breweries 47   
where the court was faced with the substantive fairness of dismissal in a 'spill-and-fill' 
operation (ie, declaring all positions redundant, redefining job descriptions and inviting 
former employees to reapply). In contrast to Fulton AJ in Dorbyl  (above), Gamble AJ 
methodically addressed the contrast between Discreto and Algorax and endorsed the latter. 
Algorax , it was found, had superseded the earlier approach and was 'of general 
application'. 48   The test of fairness to be applied in terms of Algorax was explained as 
follows: 
 '40.1 Whether the dismissal is fair or not is a question which must be answered by the court and the court must 
not defer to the employer for purposes of answering that question (at para 69). 
 40.2 The court should not hesitate to deal with an issue that requires no special expertise or business 
knowledge. Some problems require simple common sense and do not involve any complicated business 
transactions or decisions (at para 70). 
 40.3 If there is a way in which the employer could have addressed the problems by using solutions which 
preserve jobs rather than which cause job losses (or which could lead to further job losses), the court should 
not hesitate to deal with the matter on the basis that the employer should have used that solution, rather than 
the one which causes job losses: 
  ''This is especially so because resort to dismissal, especially so-called no fault dismissal, which some 
regard as the death penalty in the field of labour and employment law, is meant to be a measure of last 
resort' (at para 70). 
See also WG Davey (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA  (1999) 20 ILJ 2017 (SCA) at 2024F. 
 40.4 Referring to section 189(2) and (3) the Judge President held as follows in the Algorax case: 
  ''It seems to me that the reason for the lawmaker to require all of these things from the employer was 
to place an obligation on the employer to only resort to dismissing employees for operational 
requirements as a measure of last resort . If that is correct, the court is entitled to intervene when it is 
clear that certain measures could have been taken to address the problems without dismissals for 
operational reasons or where it is clear that dismissal was not resorted to as a measure of last resort' (at 
para 70) (emphasis added).' 
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After referring to subsequent judgments (dealt with above) in which this approach was 
upheld, the court went on to cite the following passage from BMD Knitting Mills  - 
apparently, as an amplification of the meaning of 'fairness': 
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 'The starting-point is whether there is a commercial rationale for the decision. But, rather than take such 
justification at face value, a court is entitled to examine whether the particular decision has been taken in a 
manner which is also fair to the affected party, namely the employees to be retrenched. To this extent the court 
is entitled to enquire as to whether a reasonable basis exists on which the decision, including the proposed 
manner, to dismiss for operational requirements is predicated.' 49 
Although the point is not elaborated further, the assumption appears to be that the above 
formulation of 'fairness' is consistent with the test laid down in Algorax . If this is so, the 
criterion of a 'reasonable basis' must be taken as meaning the same, for practical purposes, 
as a 'last resort'. While this stretches the limits of grammatical meaning, reliance was also 
placed on the approach laid down by Nicholson JA in General Food Industries Ltd v FAWU  
(above), to the effect that substantive reasons for dismissal 'will only be accepted as valid if 
the employer can show that all viable alternative steps have been considered and taken to 
prevent the retrenchments or to limit these to a minimum'. 50   And, finally, Gamble AJ 
stated his intention of applying an approach similar to that of Davis AJA in Enterprise Foods 
v Allen , where it was held that if 'there are two rational solutions, one of which preserves 
jobs, fairness as mandated by the Labour Relations Act ... dictates that this is the solution 
that must be adopted by the employer'. 51 
These statements give rise to similar speculation as in the case of Dorbyl . In both cases the 
court appears to be uncomfortable with the term 'measure of last resort' and the 
implications of applying it strictly. In both cases, accordingly, the court seems concerned to 
find an analogous term for expressing the essence of the test which, while remaining 
consistent with Algorax , will shift the enquiry to more familiar ground. Fulton AJ achieved 
this by relying on Afrox while noting 'necessity' as an equivalent to 'last resort'; Gamble AJ 
did so by asserting a 'reasonable basis' test while at the same time using the yardstick of 
'all viable alternative steps' for measuring compliance with the mandated test. Having done 
so, Gamble AJ - like Fulton AJ - 
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went on to note, with reference to Fry's Metals , that 'in a market-driven economy there can 
be no objection, in principle, to retrenching to increase profit margins (there is after all a 
duty to shareholders to do so)'. 52   Finally, the court accepted that 'the company's reliance 
upon [world-class manufacturing] as the primary factor motivating change in its workplace 
constitutes a valid ''commercial rationale'' 53   which, on the facts of the case, was 
regarded as satisfying the requirements of substantive fairness. 
More light is shed on the nature of the test by the manner in which Gamble AJ applied it. 
The individual applicants were divided into five categories according to the circumstances of 
their dismissal. One category, it was found, was dismissed 'because the company held the 
view that they were not capable of being trained' for new positions. In their case, it was 
held, the employer did not take 'adequate steps to assist these employees in obtaining 
[training]' and, therefore, failed to show that '''all viable steps' to avoid retrenchment had 
been considered and taken'. 54 
Another category was 'afforded an opportunity to enter into the training phase [and] 
evaluated thereafter'. In the absence of evidence to show 'that their subsequent 
retrenchment was not reasonably based on their failure to meet the criteria set down in that 
evaluation process', their dismissals were found to be substantively fair. 55   Having trained 
the employees, in other words, the employer was deemed to have taken 'all viable steps' for 
purposes of the test. Although dismissal was not an absolute last resort - it was, 
presumably, possible to have given the employees more training - Gamble AJ appeared 
satisfied that the standard set in Algorax had been met. 
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The dismissal of yet another group of employees due to the outsourcing of their functions 
was held to be substantively unfair because, on the facts, 'no compelling reason [was] 
advanced by the company to explain why the decision to outsource in respect of this 
category of applicants was necessary to advance the interests of [world-class 
manufacturing]'. 56   Lastly, the dismissal of employees who had failed to apply for 
positions in terms of the new dispensation, was held to be substantively fair. While it would 
have been possible for the employer to - for example - invite them to apply, it appears to 
have been accepted once again that the employer's duty to consider 'all viable alternatives' 
should not be interpreted too literally. 
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Conclusion: In Principle... 
What answer does this survey of case law give to the question with which the article 
started: when is it 'fair' for an employer, in the course of restructuring its business, to 
dismiss an employee for declining to accept changes in her or his terms and conditions of 
employment? 
Two propositions present themselves. The first is that the formulation of the court's role in 
Algorax and subsequent decisions undoubtedly allows greater scope for intervention with 
employers' decisions to dismiss than the more cautious formulation adopted in Discreto . 
This may be seen, at least indirectly, as a reflection of the acute societal concern about 
mass unemployment and job losses prevailing in the era of Algorax . On the face of it, 
certainly, the ruling that dismissal is only permissible as 'a measure of last resort' appears 
to arm the court with powers of prohibiting job losses along the lines demanded by labour 
during the negotiations leading up to the 2002 amendments to the LRA. But it may also be 
said to reflect an ongoing judicial concern to make sense of a complex requirement of law - 
the requirement that a dismissal based on operational needs must have a 'fair' reason, to be 
tested in the consultation process against criteria such as alternatives to dismissal - which, 
arguably, had previously been given insufficient weight. As such, the interrogation may be 
expected to continue. 
This leads to the second proposition, which must be more tentative. Can it be said that, 
even in the brief period since the judgment in Algorax was handed down, the courts have 
set about qualifying it, softening its interventionist edge and bringing it more closely into 
line with the earlier law? 
It is a fact that the courts have in no instance found occasion to interfere with an employer's 
decision to dismiss on the grounds that it was not 'a measure of last resort'. In Algorax 
itself, as noted already, the principle was stated obiter. In Enterprise Foods v Allen a drop in 
profits from 19% to 9%, combined with the union party's acceptance that there were 
'justifiable economic reasons' for closing the plant in question, led the LAC to accept that 
the dismissals were substantively fair. 57   Similarly, in General Food Industries v FAWU , 
the court accepted that a 5,9% profit level was not viable and the fact that costs at the 
employer's Salt River plant were significantly higher than at other plants, exacerbated by a 
general wage increase, created a situation where dismissals were justified. 
These rulings, as much as the approach adopted by the LC in Dorbyl and SA Breweries , 
indicate that the 'last resort' principle cannot be interpreted in isolation and is, in practice, 
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closely related to the fact that 'operational needs' are not limited to saving a business from 
extinction. To the extent that the 'last resort' criterion suggests the contrary, it is 
undoubtedly in need of clarification. Viewed in this 
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light, the difference between Algorax and Discreto becomes less stark and terms such as 
'necessary' (Dorbyl ) or 'reasonable basis' for dismissal (BMD Knitting Mills , FAWU v SA 
Breweries ) find their place in helping to define the meaning of 'last resort' in this particular 
context. In principal the position arrived at by the courts may be summarized as follows: 
 '(a)  To be valid, a dismissal for operational reasons must be (i) based on an 'operational requirement' as 
defined in s 213 of the LRA and, within this framework, (ii) for a 'fair' reason. 
 (b)  A fair reason for dismissal is not limited to efforts to save a business but may be related to any 
legitimate business objective, including bona fide attempts at improving its efficiency, profitability or 
competitiveness. 
 (c)  However, not every reason related to a legitimate business objective will be fair. Dismissal will only be 
substantively fair if it represents 'a measure of last resort', or is 'necessary', to achieve the objective in 
question. The employer must show, in other words, that in pursuing that objective 'all viable alternative 
steps have been considered and taken to prevent the retrenchments or to limit these to a minimum'. 58 
Notwithstanding the assumption made by Gamble AJ in FAWU v SA Breweries , it is not 
obvious that a 'reasonable basis' for dismissal means quite the same as a 'necessary' reason 
for dismissal, let alone a 'measure of last resort'. 59   It may be argued that the distinction 
between 'reasonable' and 'necessary' in this context is comparable to the distinction 
between a 'reasonable employer' and a 'fair employer' test. 60   A 'reasonable basis' for 
dismissal implies that the decision to dismiss forms one of a range of decisions that the 
employer might reasonably take in order to achieve the business objective in question. 61   
The 
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decision in Algorax , it is submitted, marks a shift from this position to one more akin to a 
'fair employer' standard. It implies that the court will not only require the decision to be one 
of a 'reasonable' range but will expect the employer to show that it was, in effect, the only 
viable option remaining after all other possible means of achieving its objective had been 
rejected on reasonable grounds or exhausted. 62 
 
 
... And in Practice 
There is scope, however, for a significant degree of continuity with the earlier approach. In 
Algorax  Zondo JP acknowledged that, while the court should not hesitate to substitute its 
judgment for that of the employer in relation to business issues that can be resolved by the 
simple application of 'common sense and logic', it will 'normally ... not have the business 
knowledge or expertise which the employer as a businessperson may have to deal with 
problems in the workplace'. 63   To this extent the courts may be expected to continue to 
defer to employers' business instincts and judgment calls as to the necessity of business 
objectives and the viability or non-viability of specific measures for achieving them. Unless 
bad faith or irrationality is manifest - for example, in refusing to consider alternatives to 
dismissal proposed by a consulting party - it is submitted that courts are likely to continue 
to apply the approach set out in Discreto when weighing up the 'necessity' of the decision to 
dismiss. 
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This, it is suggested, describes the approach that was followed in General Food Industries v 
FAWU and Enterprise Foods v Allen in finding that the employer's decision to dismiss was in 
both cases substantively fair. So, too, in Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v NUM & others 64   the 
LAC accepted the substantive fairness of dismissals in the context of restructuring - in this 
case, without any reference to the 'last resort' principle - for the purpose of making the 
employer 'competitive'. 65   The employees were dismissed, in essence, for refusing to 
relinquish their existing status and becoming independent contractors. While the dispute 
turned to a large extent on whether the dismissals were automatically unfair, the LAC 
unanimously rejected the finding by the Labour Court that the employer could have resorted 
to a lock-out as an alternative to dismissal. 66   The reasoning of the court in this regard is 
terse and, on the face of it, not persuasive. Given the 
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complexity of the facts, perhaps, too much should not be made of this. However, it is 
suggested that the demands placed on employers to explore 'all viable alternatives' to 
dismissal may not be very high. 
In contrast, the Labour Court in Masilela v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 67   was confronted 
with a set of facts which led it to conclude - again without reference to Algorax  - that the 
employer's decision to dismiss, though based on operational needs, was substantively 
unfair. In this matter, involving the dismissal of the applicant from his position as industrial 
relations manager, the possibility of offering him a more junior post as an alternative to 
dismissal was canvassed during the consultation process but not explored further. Both the 
court's deference to the employer's judgment, and its preparedness to use 'common sense 
and logic' in faulting that judgment, are evident in the manner that Francis AJ resolved the 
issue: 
 'There is an obligation in terms of s 189(3)(b) of the Act for the respondent to consider alternatives to 
retrenchment. The junior post was an alternative that was not pursued. The applicant was the only person who 
was affected by the retrenchment. I fail to understand why the position if it were created, was not offered to 
the applicant alone.... 
 [36] I accept that there was a duplication of skills that existed after Masina was employed.... I accept also that 
there was a need to make the position of the industrial relations manager's post redundant. I do however not 
accept that there was a need to retrench the applicant. The junior administrative position should have been 
created and offered to the applicant. This could have prevented his dismissal. The dismissal was therefore 
substantively unfair.' 68 
Similarly, in Springbok Trading (Pty) Ltd v Zondani & others 69   the LAC - again without 
reference to its own earlier decisions - found that the employer's motive for dismissing its 
hourly paid workforce in order to transfer them to a labour broker was no more than the 
desire to rid itself of the 'inconvenience' of maintaining them on its payroll. There can be 
little doubt that this reason, such as it is, was based on the employer's 'organizational' 
needs and, therefore, technically within the definition of 'operational requirements'. 
However, as Jafta AJA observed, 'I do not think that that kind of inconvenience was a fair 
reason warranting [dismissal of] the employees'. 70 
Also in General Food Industries Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Bakeries v FAWU & others 71   the 
employees' dismissal was found to be substantively unfair. Although it was 'common cause 
that there was a need for the appellant to retrench ... it was not common cause that there 
was a need for the appellant to retrench the particular employees that the appellant 
retrenched'. 72   In the first place, new employees were employed at other 
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branches of the employer's business shortly before the dismissal of the respondents. 
Second, the employer had failed to 'bump' the dismissed employees into the positions of 
employees performing similar work, but with shorter service, at other branches. Although, 
once again, the court made no reference to its judgment in Algorax and subsequent 
decisions, it ruled in effect that the dismissal of the employees in question was not 
'necessary' to achieve the employer's objective. 
Most recently, in SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd , 73   the Labour Court 
again had occasion to consider the substantive fairness of the dismissal of employees in the 
context of a restructuring exercise. The cardinal fact in this matter was that the union did 
not challenge the fairness of the reason for the dismissal. As a result, Murphy AJ found, 
'there is no evidence that the decision to outsource was not for a legitimate, commercially 
justifiable objective, or that it was arbitrary or capricious in any way'. 74   More 
problematical is the reliance placed by the court on the test for substantive fairness as 
formulated in Discreto and BMD Knitting Mills. On this basis, the following conclusion is 
drawn: 
 'The two decisions are not entirely at odds with one another. They are simply elucidations of the governing 
principle that the decision to dismiss must be operationally justifiable on rational grounds, which permits some 
flexibility in the standard of judicial scrutiny, depending on the context.' 75 
In support of this conclusion, reference is made to s 189A(19)(b) of the LRA which states 
that, in the case of 'major retrenchments' subject to s 189A, dismissal is substantively fair if 
it is 'operationally justifiable on rational grounds'. It is, however, questionable whether 
consideration of this standard is appropriate in casu. The dismissals took place in 1999 and 
the case appears to have been referred to the Labour Court well before the promulgation of 
s 189A. To the extent that s 189A introduces changes of a purely procedural nature, there is 
no reason why it cannot apply to disputes that arose prior to its promulgation. To the extent 
that it affects 'rights actually vested at the time of [its] promulgation', however, it must be 
presumed not to operate retrospectively. 76   If the interpretation of recent jurisprudence 
suggested in this article is correct, the standard laid down in s 189A(19)(b) is less rigorous 
than that developed by the courts in terms of s 188 and the protection of employees against 
dismissal correspondingly more limited. 
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If this is so, then s 189A(19) must be understood as applying only to disputes that arose 
subsequent to its promulgation in August 2002. 
The point must be taken further. The above argument rests on the assumption that the 
standard laid down by s 189A(19)(b) applies only to major retrenchments' in terms of s 
189A; but given the clear wording of subsecton (19), there seems no reason for doubting 
that this is the case. No attempt is made to extend the test to all cases of dismissal for 
operational reasons. In principle, in other words, different criteria of 'fairness' may apply to 
different categories of employees in dismissal disputes, thus prima facie infringing their (and 
their employers') constitutional right to equal treatment. 77   The differentiation, however, 
may well fall within the scope permitted by s 36(1) of the Constitution (the limitation 
clause) which permits the limitation of basic rights subject to stringent criteria. 78   The 
effect of the differentiation, as argued above, is that employees not subject to s 189A enjoy 
greater legal protection against dismissal than those to whom the narrow criterion laid down 
in s 189A(19)(b) is applicable. This, however, may be justifiable by the fact that the latter 
have a right to strike against the reason for their dismissal, which is not available to other 
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employees. 79   From a purposive standpoint, this additional weapon may be seen as a quid 
pro quo for a lesser degree of legal protection. It must immediately be conceded that it is 
highly unlikely that the legislature intended s 189A to have such an effect. At the time of its 
enactment the judgment of the LAC in Algorax had not yet been delivered and, quite 
possibly, parliament was merely seeking - as suggested by Murphy AJ - to codify the law as 
it stood. But the ongoing development of case law by the LAC and the LC - notwithstanding, 
and in full knowledge of, the standard laid down by s 189A(19) - cannot be ignored. The 
combined effect, it is submitted, has been to introduce a new set of questions that has still 
to be addressed by the courts. 
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Returning to the judgment in SATAWU v Old Mutual , it appears that Murphy AJ was 
referring to the wording of s 189A(19) not as a source of binding law (which would have 
meant applying it retrospectively) but merely as an 'indication [by the legislature] of the 
standard to be applied'. 80   Even so, it is respectfully submitted that the reference is 
inappropriate. Nowhere does the judgment consider the test for substantive fairness as 
formulated in Algorax , Enterprise Foods and General Food Industries v FAWU which - if this 
article is correct - must be considered an authoritative interpretation of the meaning of 
'substantive fairness' in dismissals falling outside the ambit of s 189A. Although, on the 
facts, the employer's decision in this matter might well have met the criterion asserted in 
Algorax , it would seem that the approach adopted by the court in arriving at its finding is at 
odds with the precedent laid down by the LAC. 
Is the new criterion excessively strict? A decade or two ago the answer might well have 
been 'yes'. In today's climate it is less clear. The Constitution, and the LRA, require a careful 
balancing of employers' and workers' rights in order to maintain a 'fair' proportionality 
between them. Global competition and the dismantling of trade barriers have significantly 
undermined employees' bargaining position. A more rigorous interpretation of substantive 
fairness to reinforce the position of employees facing dismissal as a consequence of 
restructuring, while far from redressing the balance, may well be consistent with the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices to which ss 188, 189 and 189Aof the LRA seek to 
give effect. 
The practical question, given the inconclusive trend of recent case law, is how far the courts 
will go in developing the principle enunciated in Algorax . Will this approach, like that of the 
LAC in NUMSA v ADE , be overtaken by the equivalent of a latter-day Discreto ? Or will the 
LAC concentrate its mind and continue the work it has started? With global pressures 
relentlessly persisting, and the talk of strike action against ongoing job losses once again 
being heard from the trade union movement, 81   the next year or two may well bring an 
answer. 
 † Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC); [2003] 11 Bllr 1081 
(Lac). 
 * Certain of the views expressed in this article were first mooted by the author in 'Retrenchment - A Measure of 
Last Resort Only?' (2004) 13 Labour Law News & CCMA Reports (4). I am also indebted to Graham Giles for 
giving me access to some of the most recent judgments and commentaries, with unbelievable promptness. 
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 36 (2003) 24 ILJ 355 (LAC); [2003] 7 BLLR 647 (LAC) at para 27. This ruling - reinforced by that in Algorax and 
later decisions, discussed above - is not considered by Todd & Damant in their emphatic assertion that 
'[r]etrenchment need not be ''necessary'' in an absolute sense to be fair. Nor need it be ''unavoidable'' ' (op 
cit at 908 - although, as will be argued, the contrast between the two criteria is less absolute than it may 
seem: see discussion at n 61 below. 
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 37 (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC);  
[2003] 2 BLLR 140 (LAC). 
 38 (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA), application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the LAC was refused. See 
also n 7 above. 
 39 s 187(1)(c) of the LRA. 
 40 at paras 32-3. 
 41 And was followed subsequently: see, for example, the minority judgment of Hlope AJA in Algorax: 'The 
necessity to effect changes in order for a business to be more viable or to improve efficiency therein falls 
within the ambit of operational requirements' (at para 46). 
 42 (2004) 25 ILJ 1300 (LC); [2004] 9 BLLR 914 (LC). 
 43 at para 4.1.5. 
 44 ibid. Nor, it may be noted, did the court in Algorax refer to the Discreto judgment. 
 45 at para 5.1.12. 
 46 See the discussion at 36 above. 
 47 (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC); [2004] 11 BLLR 1093 (LC). 
 48 at para 43. 
 49 at para 47. The words 'has been taken in a manner which', which would limit the enquiry to procedural 
fairness, appear to be out of place in the present context and, it is submitted, need to be disregarded in 
order to make sense of the reasoning. 
 50 at para 44. 
 51 at para 47. Though this ruling is said to be a confirmation of Davis AJA's earlier 'reasonable basis' test in BMD 
Knitting Mills (quoted above), Davis AJA was in fact following the judgment in Algorax (at para 70). It is 
respectfully submitted that the resemblance between the 'reasonable basis' test and that applied in 
Enterprise Foods is not obvious enough to be asserted without more. 
 52 at para 51. In addition, the court stressed the caveat by Davis AJA in BMD Knitting Mills that 'fairness, not 
correctness is the mandated test' (at paras 47, 83). This would seem to further distance the court from 
Algorax in which, as noted above, the court unambiguously asserted its jurisdiction to overrule an 
employer's business decisions under appropriate circumstances. 
 53 at para 53. 
 54 at paras 76 and 167. 
 55 at para 169. 
 56 at para 182. On this basis, the employer's defence might be said to have failed the first leg of the test - that is, 
the existence of a reason based on its actual operational requirements - rather than the fairness of such a 
reason. 
 57 Enterprise Foods v Allen at paras 14-6. 
 58 per Nicholson JA in General Food Industries v FAWU. Todd & Damant arrive at a similar conclusion: 'If the 
employer's objection is one that is legitimate in the sense that it is motivated by genuine commercial 
considerations, then retrenchment need be unavoidable only in the sense that the employer's objective 
cannot otherwise reasonably be achieved by consensus': op cit at 908. 'Commercial considerations', in this 
context, would seem to mean the same as 'operational requirements'. Similarly Grogan states that 
'[e]mployees are not precluded from retrenching merely to increase profits, provided that retrenchment is 
the only rational way to secure that end.' Food for thought: retrenchment to enforce demands' Employment 
Law Journal vol 20 no 5 (October 2004). 
 59 The assumption, in other words, appears to be that a 'reasonable' employer will not dismiss employees unless 
it is 'necessary'. If this is accepted, it leads to the same practical conclusion as that suggested below. 
 60 As discussed in Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC); [2000] 3 BLLR 243 
(LAC) at paras 45-50. 
 61 Todd & Damant seek to resolve the contradiction between the two approaches by arguing that '[t]he court's 
duty is to determine whether the decision that the employer took falls within the range of decisions that 
may properly be described as being fair': op cit at 907. This is based on the premise that '[t]here is seldom, 
if ever, a right or wrong answer to the question whether an employer should take a particular decision that 
it considers to be in the business interests of the enterprise': op cit at 904. Although it is argued that the 
employer, therefore, 'enjoys the ultimate discretion to determine which decisions are in the best interests of 
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the business' (ibid), the authors nevertheless accept that the court must 'satisfy itself of the commercial 
rationality of the decision' and 'will . . . not defer to the employer on the question whether or not the 
dismissals in question were fair' (op cit at 906, 908). 
 62 The non-interventionist approach upheld in Discreto, on the other hand, would imply that it is not for the court 
to 'second-guess' an employer's decision to dismiss provided it is prima facie reasonable and taken in good 
faith. It is suggested that Todd & Damant go too far in concluding as a general proposition (based on their 
analysis of s 189A(19)) that 'SACTWU v Discreto establishes (correctly in our view) the applicable test. It 
has not been substituted or amended' (op cit at 910). 
 63 Algorax at para 70. 
 64 (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC); [2005] 3 BLLR 219 (LAC). 
 65 at paras 51-58. 
 66 at paras 51, 53. 'It seems to me', Jafta AJA concluded, 'that the alternative options suggested by the court a 
quo as having been available to the appellant were not viable options' (at para 53). 
 67 (2004) 25 ILJ 544 (LC); [2004] 4 BLLR 381 (LC). 
 68 at paras 35-36. See also Springbok Trading (Pty) Ltd v Zondani & others (2004) 25 ILJ 1681 (LAC); [2004] 9 
BLLR 849 (LAC). 
 69 (2004) 25 ILJ 1681 (LAC); [2004] 9 BLLR 864 (LAC). 
 70 at para 69; emphasis added. See also Cutts v Izinga Access (Pty) Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 1973 (LC); [2004] 8 BLLR 
755 (LC). 
 71 (2004) 25 ILJ 1655 (LAC); [2004] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC). 
 72 at para 13. 
 73 (2005) 26 ILJ 293 (LC); [2005] 4 BLLR 378 (LC). 
 74 at para 88. 
 75 at para 85. Grogan, without offering comment, explains the ruling in unmistakably 'reasonable employer' 
terms: 'The employer's chosen course need not be the best or least drastic; it must merely fall within the 
range of reasonable options available in the circumstances': 'Fair retrenchment' in Labour Law Sibergramme 
3/2005 (7 April 2005) at 2-3. 
 76 See Curtis v Johannesburg Municipality 1906 TS 308 at 311, where Innes CJ held as follows: 'The general rule 
is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, statutes should be considered as affecting future 
matters only; and more especially that they should if possible be so interpreted as not to take away any 
rights actually vested at the time of their promulgation': cited in Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of 
Good Hope v Bathgate 2000 (2) BCLR 151 (C) at para 121. See also Gardener v Whitaker 1994 (5) BCLR 19 
(E) at 26. 
 77 section 9(1) reads: 'Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law.' 
 78  section 36(1) states that 'rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including- 
 (a) the nature of the right; 
 (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
 (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
 (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
 (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose'. 
 79 s 189A(2)(b). Such an interpretation is implicit in Thompson's argument that the imposition of a more rigorous 
standard of 'fairness' by the courts was justified by the absence of a right to strike against dismissal: 'The 
strike prohibition . . . is specifically counter-balanced by the power of the court to assess that fairness [of 
dismissal] . . .  If [the courts] both adopt a hands-off position and maintain the strike prohibition, the 
legitimacy of that prohibition will be seriously undermined': 'Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the 
Operational Requirements Dismissal' (1999) 20 ILJ 755 at 770. While this may be said to foreshadow the 
reasoning behind the enactment of s 189A, the question remains - and the argument retains its validity - in 
respect of dismissals not subject to s 189A. 
 80 at para 84. Todd & Damant discuss it in similar vein: at 909. This approach, it is submitted, fails for the reason 
noted in the previous footnote: the definition of substantive fairness in s 189A cannot be separated from the 
right to strike which s 189A permits. If a 'hands-off' stance is fair in a context where workers may choose 
whether to take strike action or seek adjudication, it does not follow that it is equally fair if adjudicationis 
the only option. 
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